

Farmers Perspectives of development aid programs, a case study among pineapple farmers in Nsawam Municipal Assembly of Ghana.

Daniel Ankrah and Peter Dorward, University of Reading, School of Agriculture, Policy and Development. P.O.Box 237 RG6 6AR Berkshire, U.K. danieladuankrah@yahoo.com

Abstract

Development aid assistance to developing world economies come with mixed reactions from stakeholders. This study explores perspectives of key stakeholders that benefited from a grant from the United States of American government known as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) program. The study examined pineapple farmers in the Nsawam Municipal Assembly of Ghana belonging MCA assisted Farmer Based Organizations (FBOs) (MCA FBOs) and non-MCA assisted groups (non-MCA FBOs). The study employed both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The qualitative technique involved the use of focus group discussions and key informant interviews. Two past large scale government programs such as the President's Special Initiative (PSI) on Cassava Starch and a farmer-owned company known as Farmapine Company Limited were compared to the MCA program. The results of the study showed that both the MCA and non-MCA FBOs agreed that past large-scale programs failed in the past in comparison with the MCA program as a result of corruption, inappropriate time for issuing loans, political interference, the lack of rigorous monitoring and disloyalty to loan repayment on the part of farmers. The MCA program similar to past large-scale programs was also plagued with these challenges. The MCA program was however more participatory than the past two large scale programs. Lessons learnt from past government programs as well as the MCA program should guide stakeholders in policies formulation in the design and implementation of donor funded programs in Ghana and by extension most developing countries.

Keywords: *aid, farmers, Farmer Based Organizations, development program, Millennium Challenge Account.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The effectiveness of aid in developing countries remains an issue of great concern to bilateral and multilateral donors. Kharas (2007a) and (2007b) indicates that there has been a lot of donors in the aid industry resulting in disbursement becoming more fragmented and smaller. There is another dimension to the debate on aid effectiveness that argues that donor support in aid only comes in as a secondary responsibility to supplement countries that rule justly and adhere to best practices (McGillivray, Feeny, Hermes, & Lensink, 2006). In line with this fact, good governance has taken the limelight among the international donor communities (Goldsmith, 2010).

In a bid to make aid more effective, donor bodies composed of bilateral and multilateral resolved in various declarations such as the Paris Declaration signed in 2005 by both the developed and the developing countries. Another declaration was the Accra Agenda for Action that was established in 2008 to echo the goal of making an effective division of labour which saw the enactment of international good practice principles that is based on an in-country division of labour (Frot & Santiso, 2010). Various authors have emphasized the need for an aid program that addresses the inefficiencies associated with most donor aid programs see (Aal, 2007; Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2009; Frot, 2009; Frot & Santiso, 2010; Kharas, 2007a).

In line with the principles of making aid more effective, President Bush on March 2002 put forth a novel and innovative program that brought about a paradigm shift in the way the U.S. administers economic assistance. This resulted in the institution of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) which is based on the core principle that economic development is most effective if it is linked to free market economies and democratic principles. The MCC administers an aid program known as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA is given to recipient countries that "govern justly, invest in their people and encourage economic freedom" (Soederberg, 2004).

Ghana had a five-year grant of \$547 million that was targeted at poverty reduction through improvement in

farmer incomes that was led by the private sector. In tandem with this, the MCA Ghana program emphasized boosting the productivity of high-value cash crops as well as food staple crops in some selected areas of Ghana. This was envisioned to eventually enhance the competitiveness of Ghana as a major export base in terms of horticultural and other lesser known traditional crops (MiDA, 2013). Various authors (Djankov et al., 2009; Fold & Gough, 2008; Frot & Santiso, 2010; Hussi, Murphy, Lindberg, & Brenneman, 1993; Jaeger, 2008; Key & Runsten, 1999; Kharas, 2007a; Lindberg, 1993) have argued that development programs have been plagued by bad management (top-down managerial approach), corruption, less involvement of beneficiaries in decision making processes, government direct involvement in FBO activities etc. Olson and Eoyang (2001) indicated that development programs are often top down in nature and designed to be implemented through subordinated structures that are passive. Very scanty empirical studies (Asuming-Brempong & Kuwornu, 2013; Ntow, Gijzen, Kelderman, & Drechsel, 2006; Ozor, Agwu, Chukwuone, Madukwe, & Garforth, 2007) have been conducted in developing countries to ascertain perceptions of beneficiaries about development programs. It is therefore important to have a study that investigates how program beneficiaries perceive the potential benefits of large scale agricultural development programs. The study seeks to find out the perspectives of farmers about the MCA Ghana program in comparison with other past large scale development aid programs.

2. Methodology

The study was conducted in the Eastern region of Ghana. The specific study sites were Pokrom, Fotobi, Nsawam, Dobro and Ahodjotowns all in the Nsawam Adoagyire Municipal Assembly. The study compared pineapple farmer groups that benefited from the MCA program (MCA FBOs) and farmers that did not benefit (non-MCA FBOs). The FBOs were randomly selected through a lottery system and engaged in Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Focus group discussions give an invaluable insight on how participants perceive an issue, their explanations and understanding through interactions with them (Laws, Harper, & Marcus,

2006). The use of FGD remains widely used in studies involving qualitative approaches. Krueger (2009) explains that FGD is a planned series of discussions that is essentially meant to obtain peoples' views on a defined subject area in an environment that is non-threatening and permissive. The random sampling was to afford an equal chance of FBO selection and to reduce sampling bias. There were five MCA FBOs that were randomly selected through a lottery system from fourteen FBOs present. There were 2 non-MCA FBOs in the study site. The second level was to randomly select the six farmers through a lottery system within each FBO. There was however a selection of 10 members per group with the additional 4 members serving as replacements if required. Where the first six members selected randomly were not available the next person on the selected farmer list was selected in an ordered manner. The MCA FBOs were located in Pokrom, Nsawam, Dobro and Fotobi whilst the other two non-MCA FBOs were located in Fotobi and Ahodjo. The quantitative approach also made use of the simple random sampling technique in first selecting the FBOs followed by selection of the respondents within the FBOs. The mixed method approaches allows for data triangulation (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995; Silverman, 2000).

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) serve as an instrument that enables the researcher to elicit information from an individual(s) who have a wealth of knowledge on specific issues. They can represent a section of society or power or do not need to hold any position in particular (DFID UK, 1999). Key informant interviews were carried out with key stakeholders involved in the pineapple industry. A total of 25 KIIs were held with two (2) officials from Millennium Development Authority (MiDA), Central Management Consultants (CMC) responsible for the development of training manuals for MCA one (1), Technical Training Service Providers (TTSPs) two (2), Blue Skies Agribusiness Company Limited two (2), Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) two (2), 7 FBOs (2 farmers per each FBO) and two (2) officers from Combine Farms. The key informants were purposively selected based on their level of knowledge shown during the FGDs.

3. Results and discussion

Farmers gave their perspectives on reasons why the MCA Ghana program recorded lapses together with two past large government interventions namely the President's Special Initiative (PSI) on Cassava Starch and a farmer-owned company known as Farmapine Company Limited. Farmapine Ghana Limited was established in 1999 under the assistance of the World Bank and the Government of Ghana. The company operated under the Farmer Ownership Model (FOM) that was promoted by the World Bank. The company provided its members with technical assistance, production inputs, credit and market outlets. Five FBOs with 178 members owned 80% shares in the company (Takane, 2004). The PSI on cassava starch was also a government initiative on commercial cassava production for starch export. The reasons which came up from both the FGDs and survey questionnaire instrument were corruption on the part of leadership coupled with mis-management, leadership lacking training and requisite skills in specialized areas, farmers not loyal to loan repayment, financial credit not issued on time, money not given to intended target group, political interference, poor supervision, monitoring of government programs on the part of government and influence from the export market. The ensuing paragraph presents findings based on information generated from the questionnaire survey instrument.

Figure 1 below shows the rank of perception by both MCA and non-MCA FBO members about reasons why past large scale government agricultural intervention programs failed in comparison with the MCA program. The ranking by both categories of farmers is based on the absolute number of farmers that ranked each reason accounting for the failure of large scale development programs on a multiple choice scale.

Most farmers ranked corruption on the part of the leadership and mis-management of these two projects as the main reason for the collapse of the two programs. This finding is consistent with the findings by Fold and Gough (2008) that indicated that Farmapine had management lapses and invested high on administration in terms of operational cost.


This indeed was a situation that led to both categories of farmers not repaying loan granted to them. This was supported by farmers who indicated in several FGDs that government officials were corrupt so they as farmers also demanded their fair share in the perceived corruption chain. (Please see ensuing paragraph after figure 1 for discussions based on information from FGDs and KIIs). It was also observed from interaction with farmers that the notion of government officials been corrupt was well entrenched in their minds even though sometimes the reality on the grounds does not necessarily support such notion. The MCA program also suffered from this perceived corruption on the part of both MCA and non-MCA FBOs. This was reported widely in the survey instrument administered to both MCA and non-MCA FBOs. (Please see ensuing paragraph after figure 1 for discussions based on information from FGDs and KIIs). Most of the participants engaged in the survey instrument were past beneficiaries of the Farmapine Company's program. This situation led to apathy on the part of most of the stakeholders involved.

Both MCA and non-MCA FBOs ranked as very strong the issue of management and leadership of past government programs lacking the requisite experience in the field of agriculture as part of reasons that led to the collapse of the two past large scale government programs. Both categories of farmers in most FGDs perceived the MCA program to

have had this challenge. In a key informant interview with a representative of Blue Skies Company, it came up that some of the service providers in the MCA program were not well grounded in the practical aspect of agriculture. Please see quote (KII/ 8th/February/2012) in a KII in ensuing paragraphs after figure 1. It was however observed that the MCA program made some success in this area since the program only facilitated existing institutions to implement the MCA program.

Both categories of FBOs did ranked very strongly that non-payment of loans on the part of farmers led to the collapse of the two past large scale programs. It was observed in both FGDs for MCA and non-MCA FBOs that perceived corruption on the part of farmers accounted for the main motivation causing farmers not to repay loan granted. Farmers were of the view that leadership and management were corrupt. The other factor accounting for farmers' refusal to repay loans was the inappropriate time loans are usually disbursed to farmers. Example too soon before production season or even after it has started. In contrasting this situation with the MCA program it was observed that both categories of FBOs ranked very strong the issue of farmers not repaying loans acquired. The issue of the low loan recovery rate was confirmed in KIIs with representatives of MCA Ghana office and MoFA. This situation in the past and in the present renders financial stakeholders reluctant to issue loans to farmers.

Figure 1 MCA and non-MCA members views about reasons for the failure of past large scale government programs in comparison to the MCA program based on survey instrument.



Source: Field work, 2012.

Results from the FGDs and KIIs by both categories of farmers indicated that the two past large government programs namely the PSI on Cassava Starch and the Farmapine Company failed principally as a result of corruption on the part of management and leadership of the two projects. This was supported in the earlier on discussion with regards to information from the survey questionnaire. The leadership of the two programs were corrupt and not transparent in their transactions with farmers. Non-MCA farmers engaged in an FGD indicated that:

“Leaders of most government programs such as the PSI on Cassava starch and the Farmapine Company were corrupt” (Oman Cooperative, FGD/23rd/December/2011).

MCA FBO members also indicated in both FGDs that:

“Leaders of the two large scale government projects were corrupt. There were also instances where the leaders of the two projects did not take

pains to explain to us farmers the daily transactions of the projects and the exact breakdown of prices offered. Sometimes we did acknowledge that management might not actually be corrupt but because things were not properly explained to us, there was always the suspicion of corruption on our part as farmers”(Adonten Cooperative, FGD/20th/04/2012).

Generally both MCA and non-MCA FBOs emphasized corruption as a key element that led to the collapse of the two past government initiatives. They however did acknowledge the fact that there were instances where perceived corruption was misconstrued to be corruption. Both MCA and non-MCA FBOs indicated that closely linked to the issue of corruption was greed and self-centeredness on the part of leaders and managers who managed the two past large scale development programs. The leadership of the government programs did not care about the core tenants of the projects they managed but were

driven primarily by the motive to enrich and amass wealth for themselves. A non-MCA FBO member indicated in a KII that:

“Government leaders of large scale government development programs such as the PSI on Cassava Starch and the Farmapine program were greedy and self-centered. They did not care about the core program objectives. The leaders were generally corrupt” (Oman Cooperative, KII/ 23rd/December/2011).

MCA FBO members also supported this with the statements below in FGDs:

“The leaders of the Farmapine and PSI on Cassava programs were only thinking about themselves and their immediate families. They only used the programs as a means to enrich themselves at the disadvantage of farmers” (Pokrom Patriotic Cooperative, FGD/ 22nd/April/2012).

“The management of the Farmapine Company were corrupt and cheated us on the prices offered for the supply of our fruits so we stopped supplying our fruits to the company and diverted the fruits to other companies” (Apesika Cooperative, FGD/18th/April/2012).

The MCA programs similar to the two past large scale programs also recorded this challenge. It was observed from all the MCA FBO members through FGDs that they perceived that leadership of the MCA program were corrupt hence a justification for they farmers also to be corrupt. This situation is a major challenge confronting farmers regarding development programs managed by government. This has a negative effect on effective implementation of government development programs. The MCA program was also affected by corruption and rent seeking behaviours.

Another key issue that led to the collapse of the PSI on Cassava and Farmapine Company programs was the inappropriate timing for issuing financial credit under the programs. Agriculture in Ghana is season dependent and

therefore time sensitive, and issuing money at an inappropriate time along the production line leads to situations whereby farmers' use the money for non-agricultural activities such as paying children's school fees, hospital bills, attending funerals among others. This is because the loans were granted too late to afford farmers the opportunity to invest in production activities that they were intended for. This meant that farmers were unlikely to repay such loans. The MCA program also fell short in this regard. Money for two FBOs that received the financial credit did not come at the appropriate time for farmers' to use. Recovery rate of the money for the two FBOs were therefore problematic. The two FBOs that received the financial assistance under the MCA program indicated in a FGD that:

“Time for issuing loan did not tally with planting season or when it was needed most. This situation led to the use of loan for unintended purposes in times of needs or hardships” (Pokrom Patriotic Cooperative, FGD/9th/November/2011).

“The time the loan was issued to us was not good enough and this caused a lot of unnecessary delays in planting our pineapple suckers” (Apesika Cooperative, FGD/18th/April/2012).

The issue of financial credit not being issued at the appropriate time gives an indication of poor coordination amongst the stakeholders involved in the implementation of such programs. Similar to the two past large scale programs, the MCA program also did not disburse loans at the appropriate time.

Both categories of farmers' indicated in FGDs that political interference remained a prominent feature in the two past large scale government programs. This usually took the form of direct control by government which took away the autonomy of project managers to operate. In some instances very close financial sponsors and members belonging to political parties were made beneficiaries of such programs even when they were not farmers. Political cronies were also in some instances made head of government projects instead of technocrats. Another challenge related to political interference is the hype which ruling political parties gave to

large scale government programs. This led to lots of promises that were made by leadership of such programs which were eventually left unfulfilled. The hype was made by ruling political parties just to gain political capital. Farmers were of the view that the MCA program was also subjected to political interference in the sense that it received a lot of political hype on the part of the ruling government then. These findings were consistent with the findings of Hussi et al. (1993), Key and Runsten (1999), Porvali (1993) and Lindberg (1993) that indicated collapse of FBOs as a result of involvement of government in FBO activities. A MCA FBO engaged in a FGD indicated that:

“Political inference in large scale projects also led to collapse of the Farmapine and PSI on Cassava Starch programs. The interference took the form of direct instructions for program managers by powers above. This did not allow managers to have their own free will to operate the business successfully. Political cronies were in some instances made to head such institutions instead of technocrats”, (Adoten Cooperative, FGD/20th/April/2012).

“There was political interference in both the Farmapine and PSI on cassava Starch programs and this contributed to the collapse of the projects” (Pokrom Patriotic Cooperative, FGD/22nd/April/2012)

Non-MCA FBOs in a FGD also indicated that:

“Money was sometimes given to political allies who were not necessarily farmers. Sometimes farmers who were strong party activist also benefited from large scale government development programs” (Enkakyi Cooperative, FGD/6th/December/2011).

The MCA program also suffered from political hype and farmers also perceived the ruling government interfering in

the activities of MCA Ghana program. The MCA program even though it was managed by an independent institution had political biases in the view of some sections of MCA and non-MCA FBO members. The ruling party at the time made political capital from the approval of the MCA Ghana program which entrenched the already existing political affiliations of government programs.

The Ghanaian economy is generally polarized along political party affiliations especially in the rural settings where farmers are politically attached to specific political parties. This situation leads to farmers declining to join some government programs or just taking advantage of the monetary gains from programs without necessarily being committed to the program tenets. This situation can also lead to poor interaction amongst some actors in the innovation system, who can deliberately implement strategies towards the failure of the ruling government to make the government unpopular for another government to take over power. It was observed that the MCA program just as the two past large scale programs as a result of political interference lacked very strong interaction and coordination amongst the stakeholders. This was a contributing factor for the collapse of the two large scale programs and the lapses observed in the MCA program.

It was also observed that leadership of such programs lacked the technical expertise and training in the particular projects to which they headed. Farmers indicated that it would be useful if technical experts are made to head large scale development programs. There were instances where farmers were more knowledgeable in their fields than the trainers that trained them. Farmers further did indicate that they could be appointed to head such projects rather than hiring university graduates that lacked understanding into the core agricultural production issues. The Agronomist from Blue Skies Company Limited supported the point made by farmers in a KII:

“It is interesting to note that some of the managers of the past large government projects lacked technical expertise into projects for which they headed. They were just arm-chair professors who

sat in the offices to receive reports” (Blue Skies Company, KII/ 8th/February/2012).

Farmers from a MCA FBO indicated in a FGD that:

“We are more knowledgeable in our field than our leaders, they always come and learn from us and we are of the view that some of us can lead such large scale government projects better” (Pokrom Patriotic Cooperative, FGD/ 22nd/April/2012).

The MCA program differed from the two past large scale programs in the sense that the MCA management was not seen to be lacking the technical expertise but farmers rather perceived some of the trainers to be deficient in some aspects of knowledge which they farmers knew. This view was widespread in most of the FGDs conducted with both the MCA and non-MCA FBOs but it was however observed that it was more widely and strongly felt by the non-MCA FBOs. The MCA program however was more participatory than the two past large scale government programs because it employed a more participatory approach in its implementation. The MCA program used already existing stakeholders to implement the MCA program which helped farmers to identify more easily with some stakeholders that they were already familiar with.

The lack of a rigorous monitoring and supervision of large scale programs on the part of government and other supervisory units contributed to the collapse of the Farmapine Company and the PSI on Cassava programs. It was reported widely in most FGDs and KIIs that projects set up by the government were not properly supervised and monitored to achieve the desired results. This was articulated by a non-MCA FBO during a FGD:

“There are improper supervision and monitoring of past government programs greatly affected the sustainability of the two past government programs” (Oman Cooperative, FGD/23rd/December/2011).

A MCA FBO also further supported this assertion with the statement below:

“Government was very keen in getting projects implemented but in most cases when the projects took off, poor monitoring of the projects became the order of the day. Even when farmers complained about certain issues there were no feed backs or delayed feedbacks” (Fotobi Cooperative, 24th/April/2012).

MCA FBOs members engaged in FGDs and KIIs explained that MoFA as a key implementing stakeholder was not able to embark on rigorous monitoring of the MCA program and similar to the two past large scale programs did not have a very rigorous monitoring by MoFA staff to ascertain on the ground what was actually happening. This situation MoFA explained was due to the inadequate number of extension agents that were needed to embark upon such needed rigorous monitoring.

It emerged from the FGDs that the external export market also contributed to the collapse of Farmapine. The introduction of the MD2 pineapple variety led to a shift in focus from the dominant Smooth Cayenne pineapple variety hence a decline in the demand for the Smooth Cayenne. This led to a switch over to the MD2 which was not anticipated by Farmapine Company and this rendered Farmapine unable to export the needed quantities of the Smooth Cayenne and also unable to pay its out-grower farmers. MCA FBO farmers indicated in FGDs that:

“The export market also contributed to the collapse of the Farmapine Company because of the sudden demand for MD2 on the export market” (Nsabah Cooperative, FGD/9th/December/2011).

“The world market dictates the prices of our fruits and also the demand for the pineapple, these two factors were contributing factors that led to the collapse of Farmapine” (Fotobi Cooperative, FGD/24th/April/2012).

4. Conclusion

Farmers in the MCA and non-MCA FBOs agreed that past large-scale programs failed in the past in comparison with the MCA program as a result of corruption, inappropriate

time for issuing loans, political interference and the lack of rigorous monitoring of such programs. It was observed from the survey instrument, the FGDs and KIIs that there were no differences in the perceptions of both the MCA and non-MCA FBOs about the reasons that accounted for the failure of the two past government programs such as Farmapine and the PSI on Cassava Starch. The MCA program similar to the Farmapine Company was also prone to the effects of the external market. To a greater extent the MCA program was plagued with the issue of perceived corruption of leaders and managers of programs by farmers and the inappropriate time for issuing loans with its attendant low loan recovery rate. These factors were cited by farmers because of their past experiences with the two past government programs and the MCA program as well. There is a need to address these challenges associated with the implementation of development aid programs as these challenges contribute immensely to the failure of government development programs. The MCA program was however more participatory than the past two large scale programs.

The key problem of lack of institutional credit is encouraged to be addressed. This can be done through the use of a behaviour change communication specialist to help change the mindsets of farmers that government officials are corrupt hence a justification for them to be corrupt. This leads to low loan recovery rates among farmers. There is a need for farmers to realize that new ideas and new ways of farming

References

- [1] Aal, M. H. (2007). *The Egyptian cooperative movement: between state and market. Cooperating out of Poverty: The Renaissance of the African Cooperative Movement, ILO/The World Bank Institute, Geneva/Washington DC, forthcoming.*
- [2] Asuming-Brempong, S., & Kuwornu, J. K. (2013). *Policy Initiatives and Agricultural Performance in Post-independent Ghana. Journal*

can lead to the generation of increased capital or money that they need from government. Farmers are encouraged to be innovative in finding new and better ways of farming in raising the needed capital that they need. In this direction the benefits of being an FBO member can be fully harnessed. The main financial institution Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) is encouraged to engage with farmers to explore alternative ways of making loan repayment more effective. ADB is encouraged not to abandon their responsibilities to pineapple farmers.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the Ghana Education Trust Fund for the provision of funding in undertaking this study. We are also grateful to the management of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) in the Nsawam Municipal for their assistance in terms of information especially Mr. Bethel Akpotosu (MIS Officer), Lawrence Tagoe and Mr. Yusif both Agricultural Extension Agents (AEAs). We also express profound gratitude to Dr. Kofi Marfo and Mrs. Linda NaaTettehKorley both of the Millennium Development Authority (MiDA)- the body responsible for administering the MCA Ghana program. We express gratitude to Dr. John Azu of the Central Management Consultants (CMCs). Finally we express thanks and gratitude to the leadership and members of all the FBOs involved in the study.

of Social and Development Sciences, 4(9), 425-434.

- [3] DFID UK. (1999). *Sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets. London: DFID.*
- [4] Djankov, S., Montalvo, J. G., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2009). *Aid with multiple personalities. Journal of Comparative Economics, 37(2), 217-229.*
- [5] Fold, N., & Gough, K. V. (2008). *From smallholders to transnationals: the impact of changing consumer preferences in the EU on*

Ghana's pineapple sector. Geoforum, 39(5), 1687-1697.

- [6] Frot, E. (2009). *Early vs. late in aid partnerships and implications for tackling aid fragmentation. Stockholm: SITE Working Paper(1).*
- [7] Frot, E., & Santiso, J. (2010). *Crushed aid: fragmentation in sectoral aid: OECD Development Centre.*
- [8] Goldsmith, A. A. (2010). *No country left behind? Performance standards and accountability in US foreign assistance. Development Policy Review, 28(1), 7-26.*
- [9] Hammersley, M., & Atkinson, P. (1995). *Ethnography: Principles in practice: Psychology Press.*
- [10] Hussi, P., Murphy, J., Lindberg, O., & Brennehan, L. (1993). *The development of cooperatives and other rural organizations: the role of the World Bank.*
- [11] Jaeger, P. (2008). *Ghana Export Horticulture Cluster Strategic Profile Study. Part I-Scoping review Report prepared for World Bank Sustainable Development Network (WB-SDN), Africa Region, Agriculture and Rural Development (AFTAR), The Republic of Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture and European Union All ACP Agricultural Commodities Programme (EU-AAACP).*
- [12] Key, N., & Runsten, D. (1999). *Contract farming, smallholders, and rural development in Latin America: the organization of agroprocessing firms and the scale of outgrower production. World Development, 27(2), 381-401.*
- [13] Kharas, H. (2007a). *The new reality of aid: foreign aid, global economics, global poverty, development, sustainable development. Brookings Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/08aid_kharas.aspx.*
- [14] Kharas, H. (2007b). *Trends and issues in development aid, Brookings Wolfensohn Center for Development. Working Papers, No. 1.*
- [15] Krueger, R. A. (2009). *Focus groups: A practical guide for applied research: Sage.*
- [16] Laws, S., Harper, C., & Marcus, R. (2006). *Research for development. London: Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi, Sage Publications.*
- [17] Lindberg, O. (Ed.). (1993). *Kenya: review of the cooperative sector with special emphasis on coffee cooperatives. In: H. Porvali (ed.), The Development Of Cooperatives and Other Rural Organizations, Agriculture and Rural Development Series.*
- [18] McGillivray, M., Feeny, S., Hermes, N., & Lensink, R. (2006). *Controversies over the impact of development aid: it works; it doesn't; it can, but that depends.... Journal of International Development, 18(7), 1031-1050.*
- [19] MiDA. (2013). Retrieved 25/09/2013, from http://www.mida.gov.gh/site/?page_id=184
- [20] Ntow, W. J., Gijzen, H. J., Kelderman, P., & Drechsel, P. (2006). *Farmer perceptions and pesticide use practices in vegetable production in Ghana. Pest management science, 62(4), 356-365.*
- [21] Olson, E. E., & Eoyang, G. H. (2001). *Facilitating organization change: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer.*

[22] Ozor, N., Agwu, A., Chukwuone, N., Madukwe, M., & Garforth, C. (2007). *Cost-sharing of agricultural technology transfer in Nigeria: Perceptions of farmers and extension professionals. Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension, 13(1), 23-37.*

[23] Porvali, H. (Ed.). (1993). *The development of co-operatives. Washington, D.C: The World Bank.*

[24] Silverman, D. (2000). *Doing qualitative research: a practical handbook. London: SAGE.*

[25] Soederberg, S. (2004). *American empire and excluded states: the millennium challenge account and the shift to pre-emptive development. Third World Quarterly, 25(2), 279-302.*

[26] Takane, T. (2004). *Smallholders and nontraditional exports under economic liberalization: The case of pineapples in Ghana. African Study Monographs, 25(1), 29-43.*